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

LESSONS FROM A U.S. ARMY JTF SOUTHERN EUROPEAN TASK FORCE (SETAF)

by MAJ Richard J. Runde Jr., Team D, BCTP

JOINT TASK FORCE MISSION: *To Facilitate Humanitarian Assistance in a Joint/Combined Operational Environment.*

PURPOSE: The following observations were gained from correspondence between a JTF commander, his staff and the theater CINC for a recent humanitarian assistance contingency operation within a Joint/Combined environment. The following observations are unclassified. This article captures universal JTF lessons to support and prepare other organizations for similar operations. This is not an after-action report.

WHAT IS A JTF?: Forward deployed, rapid response and mission-capable organizations with a two-star-level organization and supporting staff need to be prepared to assume the role of a JTF in a combined operational environment. Recent history and current experiences have revalidated this fact time and again. Clearly, this mission cannot be accomplished with the organic divisional organized staff. All JTFs require augmentation. The designated JTF Headquarters must identify required staff augmentation by operational phase and purpose, through ***continual*** mission analysis. For a conventional two-star-level staff, this is normally an uncomfortable adjustment. Traditionally, a division staff's focus has "looked down," and relied upon another U.S. headquarters (corps) to "look up" to resource, synchronize and provide guidance, direction and approval. Frequently, a JTF staff will find itself reporting directly to the CINC, while performing other corps and theater responsibilities in the absence of a corps or Army-level command and control architecture.

MISSION ANALYSIS: This step of the Military Decision-Making Process does not end with the initial CINC's Warning Order (WARNORD) or Planning Order (PLANORD). Mission Analysis and the Joint Force Commander's "Change of Mission" recommendations must be revisited on a very frequent basis. In this way, the JFC can shape the JTF capabilities within its battlespace, and facilitate its operational effectiveness. The JTF commander must determine and continually re-evaluate the established preconditions for the success of each operational phase to progress to another phase, a branch or a sequel.

Status of Forces Agreement (**SOFA):** These agreements do not exist with most countries where a JTF may be sent for humanitarian assistance operations. It is unrealistic to expect that they can be negotiated on short notice for almost any contingency operation. This organization was not successful in trying to establish them. Moreover, despite continuous and focused attempts on the issue, workarounds were not successful. The JTF was forced to operate within the changing confines of the established (and continually changing) political and judicial environments of the countries where the JTF had to operate.

A Reminder!

If you have articles and lessons of interest to the Total Force, please contact the Managing Editor, Dr. Lon R. Seglie, at Coml (913) 684-3035/9567 or DSN 552-3035/9567; FAX DSN 552-9564.

DISCLAIMER

This CALL publication is not a doctrinal product and is not intended to serve as a program to guide the conduct of operations and training. The information and lessons herein have not been staffed, but are the perceptions of those individuals involved in military exercises, activities and real-world events. The intent is to share knowledge, support discussion and impart lessons and information in an expeditious manner.

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TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES

COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATION (C^3):

What is the role of a U.S. JTF within a Multi-National Force (MNF)?: Every contingency operation is different. Coalitions and alliances are also very different. International agreements take a long time to develop and many do not exist with countries where a JTF may be sent for a comparatively short period of time. A JTF headquarters may be required to directly coordinate, facilitate and execute operations for another command and control headquarters, for all or part of a contingency operation. Frequent coordination with the U.S. Embassy and other international government's political representatives will also be required.

Understanding Information Operations: Everyone wants to help, but everyone comes to a theater with different resources. Each member of the international community also comes to a theater with different geo-political and military aims. As the military and civilian players arrive in theater, they begin competing for the same critical U.S. Military resources. In the early stages of a crisis, the national and international lines of command and control will be in an evolutionary stage. This requires a JTF to temporarily step outside of the established military lines of communication. The JTF must plan and execute an aggressive information campaign in support of the CINC's objectives.

➤ **The JTF Command and Control:** Historically, when the U.S. Military is committed to a contingency, they either assumed or have been assigned the operational military lead. In future contingency operations, this may not automatically be the case. The roles, missions and functions of a JTF will change as the situation in the Combined/Joint Area of Operations evolves. A U.S. JTF may initially take the operational lead. Subsequently, the JTF may find itself subordinate, or working in parallel with other allied, multinational or coalition organizations. An international organization, such as the United Nations, may serve as the headquarters for some international military forces, while the U.S. JTF executes operations in another AO independently or in parallel.

As the situation develops, other nations may commit additional forces, resources and capabilities to the Joint/Combined Theater of Operations. Given the rapidly developing nature of these contingency operations, synchronization between international forces may initially be lacking. Absent a designated or sanctioned higher headquarters, successful operational synchronization will only be achieved through multiple communication channels.

➤ **The Joint Force Commander's Military Lines of Communication:** Frequent and direct communication and coordination with the establishing and/or the operational higher headquarters of the JTF are mission essential. This must go beyond traditional operational and intelligence summaries. The JTF Commander must tie these situation reports to his personal operational assessment and a recommended "way ahead." In this way, the JTF commander helps the CINC to achieve the desired operational end state within established or directed timelines.

This is also critical for the JTF commander. He can then influence his operational and tactical requirements in personnel, military equipment, unique civilian assets, time and space to accomplish the assigned JTF mission. Staff officers must recognize that this communication may become filtered and modified as the communication works through the multiple echelons and channels of both military and political command and control. Requests for information must be vigorously pursued.

➤ **The Joint Force Commander's International Military Lines of Communication:** Planning guidance and directives from the international and Department of State (DOS) levels may not support the actual tempo of operations within the Joint/Combined Operational Area. Mutual trust between nations must be maintained between international military counterparts and their components within the Joint/Combined Theater of Operations. This is imperative to foster effective horizontal lines of communication and facilitate information sharing. An example of the importance of this concept is the common, or uncommon understanding of the operational end state between all international political and military organizations.

➤ **The Joint Force Commander's Political Lines of Communication:** Multiple, vertical lines of communication will necessarily come into existence between participating international military organizations and their respective political representatives and decisionmakers. Some lines of communication may be merely informational. Others will be used for decisionmaking and approval. Every international and military organization has its own perspective on the current operational situation and how it is tied to their country's strategic aim.

JTF Reconnaissance and Ground Truth: Once established, or as soon as authorized, the JFC ***MUST*** place a task-organized assessment organization/team into the Joint/Combined Area of Operation. This is invaluable to both the JTF Commander and the CINC.

➤ **Liaison:** The importance of complete, competent, and trained liaison cannot be over emphasized. Liaison must not only include internal JTF components. Equally, and perhaps even more important, is liaison with multinational political, military and police organizations both inside and around the areas that are supporting the Joint/Combined Operational Forces.

➤ **Eyes on the Objective:** First-hand human reconnaissance is the best way for the JTF Commander to provide timely and accurate assessments for the CINC as the situation develops. This is essential to support the CINC's decisionmaking process and provide timely input for his staff to answer his critical information requirements.

➤ **The Joint Force Commander's Critical Information Requirements:** Satisfaction of these information requirements provides the JTF Commander with a continuous assessment of what is required to accomplish both the tactical and the operational end state. This must be done by phase, if not by week or even daily. In this way, the JTF Commander can have near real-time input to the Time-Phased Force Deployment Flow of U.S. forces into and out of the Joint/Combined Area of Operations. Additionally, force protection requirements and necessary adjustments are also assessed on a recurring basis.

➤ **Economy of Force:** Liaison and coordination with multinational forces on the ground may also prevent redundancy or identify holes in planned or current tactical or operational capabilities. Participating international military capabilities can change on almost a daily, even an hourly basis. A constant JTF assessment system or process must be established and rehearsed.

➤ **Reduced Footprint:** Host and/or supporting nation capabilities can be accurately assessed and possibly coordinated/contracted for -- first hand. This may assist, or even be mission essential in reducing the JTF's footprint throughout the Joint/Combined Operational Area. Contracting officers are mission essential to the JTF assessment team.

➤ **One Team:** Coordination and liaison with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), Private Volunteer Organizations (PVOs) and Other Governmental Agencies (OGAs) within the Joint/Combined Operational Area can only be effectively accomplished in person -- on the ground. In most cases, these organizations have been in the theater much longer than the Joint/Combined Military Force that came together as the result of a relatively recent crisis. Depending on the organization and often the personalities involved, NGOs, PVOs and OGAs can be a tremendous source of current human intelligence, assistance, coordination and even liaison.

➤ **Communication:** The importance of French or Spanish as an alternative to English as the primary language for coordination and liaison should not be underestimated. For many countries, these may be their international language. This has an even more significant impact for the JTF commander if it is spoken by key leaders and liaison officers, instead of through an interpreter.

EDUCATION AND PREPARATION OF THE JTF: Due to the size of the typical divisional "core" JTF staff, the normally temporary assignment of components and specialty staff augmentation, some additional education for U.S. Army JTFs may be required. Considerations for preparation and education include, but are not limited to:

- ☛ **JTF Reconnaissance/Assessment Checklists, i.e., Humanitarian Assistance and NEO.**
- ☛ **U.S. Military Component Capabilities and Proposed Theater Multinational Components Capabilities.**
- ☛ **U.N. Charters, Chapters, and existing Operations within the theater/C/JOA.**
- ☛ **UNHCR Capabilities and Limitations, Constraints and Restrictions.**
- ☛ **Applicable Country Studies, i.e., APODs, SPODs, LOCs, or Classes of Supply, Host-Nation Support.**
- ☛ **Applicable Threat/Opponent Studies.**
- ☛ **Current International Operations, Alliances, Support and Limitations or Restrictions within the proposed J/COA.**
- ☛ **Capabilities, Support and Coordination with SOF, DOS, USEMB and U.S. Country Teams.**
- ☛ **International Coordination and Communication, i.e., Coalition vs Alliance.**
- ☛ **Background, Mission and Capabilities of applicable NGOs, PVOs, and OGAs.**
- ☛ **Country Study Information Briefs and Frequent Updates from Other Nations, Military Forces (Peacekeepers), etc.**

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*F*orce *P*rotection *D*uring *V*ehicular *M*ovement

By MAJ Andy Arrington and CPT Fred Johnson, CALL



Task Force Eagle faced many potential threats which could deter the successful accomplishment of its mission in Bosnia. Ambushes and small-scale attacks against vehicles were identified as a major concern for force protection. As a result, it was directed that all vehicle movement in Bosnia would be conducted in elements of no less than four vehicles.

There were several reasons for establishing four vehicles as the minimum number for movement. For the most part, the requirement of four vehicles ensured that movements were conducted at platoon level for the mechanized and armored forces since there are four Bradleys or M1A1s in the platoons. However, it is important to note that many movements, particularly those conducted by nonmaneuver units, were ***not*** executed by cohesive platoon-sized elements. For example, convoys could consist of a combination of several different organizations such as civil affairs, PSYOP, military police, and the Chaplain. Regardless of the diversity of units that conducted the movement, at least one vehicle had to have either a M249 SAW or an M60 machine gun.

Possibly the most important reason for the "four-vehicle rule" was summarized in the Task Force Eagle's Commander's intent which, in part, stated that all movements throughout the area of operations would be an "intentional, preplanned, deliberate" act. This guidance resulted in units dedicating time and resources to plan and coordinate the movements, ensuring that even the most minute details were considered prior to executing a convoy - - every movement required staff coordination.

An added benefit of the four-vehicle rule, realized after several mine strikes occurred, was the flexibility provided in a mine incident. The additional vehicles at the mine strike location allowed redundant communications to call for medical evacuation, personnel and resources to conduct internal evacuation, if required, and assets to secure the area during evacuation.

In the beginning, the impact of the four-vehicle rule on operations was significant. Consider, for example, a civil affairs officer, having limited organic vehicle assets, who had to liaison with local officials. If the mission came on short notice, the officer would have to quickly coordinate for three other vehicles or identify a convoy that was traveling to the location of the meeting and was willing and capable of waiting while the meeting took place. The rule also limited the leader's ability to move freely in the area of responsibility. However, after initial growing pains, units developed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to overcome these obstacles.

The remainder of this article will provide some of the TTPs developed by units to facilitate implementation of the four-vehicle rule.

TOPIC: Implementing the Four-Vehicle Movement Restriction.

DISCUSSION: Brigades conducted numerous convoys daily. With the four-vehicle rule, the convoys had to be organized based not only on the needs of the unit, but also for compliance with the division directive. For example, if one person had to go to division to get a computer repaired, and that computer was essential to mission accomplishment, then three additional vehicles had to be identified to facilitate movement.

TTP: **Prior to the nightly commander's update, the brigade planning officer would identify all missions that required vehicular movement. He would match all the destinations with the numbers of vehicles going to that location. If four vehicles were going to division, then that convoy was considered "mission capable." Those missions that did not have the requisite number of vehicles were considered "not mission capable." This information was displayed on butcher board and was briefed to the commander at the end of the nightly update. The commander would identify the missions that he deemed critical. After the update, the planner would then task-organize additional vehicles to meet the requirement, designating vehicles that may not have business at a location, but were necessary for the convoy to be mission capable. Those convoys that were not critical and did not have enough vehicles to meet the requirement would have to internally coordinate for support. Regardless, all convoys that left the brigade operating base had to be identified on the tracking board with the following information: (1) Vehicle, by bumper number; (2) OIC of the convoy; (3) Destination and time of departure and anticipated time of return; and (4) Purpose of the convoy. Prior to departure, the OIC was required to give a convoy brief.**

TOPIC: Liaison Officer (LO) Operations under a Four-Vehicle Restriction.

DISCUSSION: A brigade developed a TTP to facilitate liaison between the HQ and subordinate units.

TTP: **The battalion LOs to the brigade were lodged near the TOC. The LOs attended the morning update where they were issued guidance, orders, and overlays. Immediately after the morning update, all the LOs convoyed together to each of their respective units to effect coordination. An additional vehicle from the brigade HHC was required to ensure that the convoy complied with the directive. Although two LOs had to wait while one LO made contact with his higher headquarters, the opportunity was present to effect adjacent unit coordination.**

TOPIC: Military Police (MP): Monitoring Unit Moves in the Area of Operation.

DISCUSSION: When the MP Brigade TOC received an order for MP support to an upcoming movement, a mission analysis (including IPB and reconnaissance) was applied at multiple levels to ensure the proper amount of MP support was allocated. In addition, leaders ensured that the appropriate equipment was used during the movement.

TTPs:

(A) After the operations order was backbriefed to the appropriate level of chain of command, the brigade exercised redundant command and control measures to monitor unit movements. Every mission that involved mounted movement was risk-assessed, particularly in terms of communications capability. If the movement was scheduled to take place over extended terrain, retrans assets at the Task Force and brigade levels were included in the plan. Communications checks and checkpoints were planned for and executed along planned routes.

(B) Additional safeguards, including those which included state-of-the-art equipment, were implemented during periods of limited visibility, which reduced the risk of fratricide occurring. All MP squads were equipped with night-vision goggles (AN-PVS 7s) and Global Positioning System (GPS) equipment which helped to ensure MPs maintain situational awareness. Simple additional safeguards, such as the use of roadguard vests and chemical lights, also help program success for military police while performing missions during limited visibility.

(C) Upon mission accomplishment, leaders were debriefed by battalion and brigade S-2 personnel to extract the most current route and mission-related information. This information was then passed through chain-of-command channels to the lowest level possible, which helped all military police maintain a high level of situational awareness.

TOPIC: Unit Standardized Fragmentary Orders: Vehicle Movement and Force Protection.

DISCUSSION: A standardized fragmentary order ensures that all Task Force requirements for convoys and force protection were followed, and ensured that all involved personnel in the convoy were briefed on the current procedures and threat levels.

TTP: **Units should consider using a similar-type fill in the blank FRAGO for convoys both during operations, such as Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, as well as in garrison. Once developed, it is a simple, but highly effective, tool for communicating the commander's intent while minimizing the dangers to the convoy participants.**

FRAGO NO._____

1. SITUATION: No change.

2. MISSION: No change.

3. EXECUTION:

a. Concept of Operations: A convoy will depart from _____ at _____ for_____on_____. Mission of the convoy is _____. Route of the convoy is_____. Estimated time of return of convoy is_____. Convoy commander is_____. Convoy consists of:

VEHICLE TYPE	BUMPER NO.	PAX
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____

b. Tasks to subordinate units:_____.

c. Coordinating Instructions:

(1) Convoys will move by FRAGO only. FRAGOs will be approved 12 hours prior to SP.

(2) Convoys will have at least four vehicles. Each vehicle will have a driver and TC. Every vehicle will have at least one M16 rifle, preferably not just the driver. The convoy will have either an M249 or an M60 machine gun.

(3) At least one vehicle will have an FM radio, preferably two.

(4) Convoys over 25 KM will have sleeping bags, water, and rations in case of a RON.

(5) Convoy commander will conduct a convoy safety and action on contact briefing at (DTG) _____at (location)_____. All convoy personnel must attend the briefing.

(6) Night moves will only be approved by the Brigade Commander. Night moves require at least one set of NVG per vehicle.

(7) Crews will be rested and remain alert at all times. TCs will not sleep during convoy movement.

(8) Conduct communication checks with the TOC prior to departure.

(9) Do not give food to the civilian personnel from the convoy.

(10) Maintain room between vehicles in the convoy for civilian vehicles to pass; however, do not get separated from the convoy.

(11) Know the radio frequencies of higher headquarters, MEDEVAC, and the unit at the convoy's destination.

(12) Conduct a sensitive item check prior to movement and upon convoy closure.

(13) Convoys will have at least one tow bar to recover broken-down vehicles.

(14) Conduct an AAR for the convoy and turn in debriefing sheets to SPO/S2.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT:_____.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL: POC for convoy is _____.

TOPIC: Pre-Convoy Briefings.

DISCUSSION: Pre-convoy briefings were given prior to every road movement.

TTP: **Convoy commanders should ensure that soldiers do not become complacent about convoy operations. Before each convoy, brief the following actions to all members of the convoy:**

- **Actions at breakdowns**
- **MEDEVAC procedures**
- **Routes, Checkpoints and Rally Points**
- **Minestrike procedures/locations of known minefields**
- **Actions on contact**
- **Actions to take if there is a break in contact**

Units should develop and drill "lost communications" actions. Both the convoy and the unit must have an established drill to regain communications, especially if the convoy is overdue. In one case, a convoy was overdue. The brigade had to send out helicopters and the QRF to regain communications.

Leaders must ensure that soldiers understand and are prepared for various dangers when conducting convoys. Special care should be taken to prevent complacency on safety, communications, and readiness issues.

TOPIC: Unit SOP: Vehicle Breakdown During Movement.

DISCUSSION: During a convoy, a vehicle broke down. The convoy did not have the necessary equipment to conduct self-recovery to tow the inoperable vehicle. The convoy commander decided to leave the vehicle with the driver and TC, while the remainder of the convoy (three vehicles) moved to the closest base camp to get assistance. Ultimately, the vehicle and personnel were left at the location overnight. The next day the vehicle was recovered without incident.

This was not the ideal solution to the problem. As a result, an SOP was developed for "vehicle breakdown procedures."

TTP: **Actions for vehicle breakdowns during convoys must be wargamed and incorporated in unit standing operating procedures. Units should approach vehicle breakdown procedures as a battle drill with actions being executed sequentially.**

Units should consider the following actions:

Step 1: Establish communications notifying the unit's higher headquarters that a vehicle in the convoy has broken down.

Step 2: Attempt self-recovery - - this step infers that the convoy has the appropriate equipment to execute the task. Pre-convoy inspections should ensure that self-recovery equipment is available and serviceable.

Step 3: If self-recovery cannot be performed, leave a vehicle with the inoperable vehicle. Before departing, the convoy commander should render a "five-point contingency plan" outlining what actions to take in specific instances (e.g., attack).

Step 4: If steps 2 and 3 are not appropriate, cross-load personnel and move to the closest base camp.

SOME CONCLUSIONS

Implementing movement restrictions, such as the four-vehicle rule, can be a challenge to units. However, effective planning and coordination can ease the strain.

☛ **Identify a central coordinating agency for movements. All movements must be tracked and monitored through that agency.**

☛ **Develop standardized fragmentary orders and procedures for movements.**

☛ **Require convoy OICs to conduct a convoy brief prior to departure.**

☛ **Establish procedures in the case vehicles breakdown during movement.✪**

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) for the Inspection of Weapons Storage Sites

By CPT Al Bazzinotti, MP SME, CALL CAAT, Bosnia

During Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, Task Force Eagle (TFE) units conducted numerous weapons storage site inspections as part of the General Framework and Agreement for Peace (GFAP). Given the broad geographical distribution of units, the changeover of unit areas of responsibility during the Transfer of Authority (between 1AD and 1ID), and the broad spectrum of weapons storage inspection sites, there was a danger that different standards would be applied during these inspections throughout the theater. The potential consequences of varying procedural and inspection standards could be extremely detrimental to our relations with the Former Warring Factions (FWF) — particularly since *weapons confiscation* is the price FWF have to pay for GFAP violations. TFE developed an SOP and TTPs to ensure standards were applied equitably throughout the theater.

". . .how an Army conducts itself is an indicator of what it stands for. . . ." **-- FM 100-5**

Some procedures that have worked well for Task Force Eagle:

Each inspection site has a *Weapons Storage Site (WSS) survey booklet.* Keep it updated routinely until it fully describes the geographic and physical layout of the site, buildings, rooms and vulnerabilities.

Notify inspected units (FWF) in advance and reconfirm prior to inspection.

Begin *every* inspection with a *leader-to-leader brief* between the inspection team leader and the inspection site leader. Review *ground rules* and give FWF leaders the opportunity to discuss any known discrepancies or issues in advance of the inspection. *Do this every time.*

Inspecting units (IFOR) ensure that the necessary equipment is ready.

Tools: crowbars, hammers, chisels, *bolt cutters, flashlights,* wirecutters, etc.. to gain access to rooms and containers.

***Seals* are helpful in some circumstances.**

Individual *short-range communications,* i.e., room to room, inspection team to security element, are absolutely *essential* for command and control *and* security.

Have a *fire extinguisher* available during the conduct of inspections if munitions are involved. Your pre-combat checks (PCIs) should include a team fire evacuation contingency plan.

Plan for *extended operations* with *weather* considerations. Proper clothing, rations, tarps, waterproofing, HEX tents and heaters should be factored in.

***Every* inspection team should have a *camera* available.**

Bring markers, chalk, paper, index cards, shoe tags, etc. Inspection teams can then mark boxes, containers, or rooms as needed.

Bring generic *hand receipts* in case confiscation is required.



When two or more rooms or buildings are involved, have at least *two* copies of the *inventory sheet* available to allow for multiple inspection teams.

Issue a *duress code* between teams as well as with security elements.

At least *two interpreters* should accompany inspections teams. This permits social activities to continue between the (U.S.) inspection team leader and the (FWF) inspection site leader, if desired, while inspection teams begin to inspect. This also facilitates the use of multiple inspection teams at one site when needed.

PCI should include *immediate action drills* and an extraction and confiscation plan that is understood to *soldier level.*

Always conduct an After-Action Review *(AAR)* at inspection team level. Collect observations in writing.

***S2 conducts debrief* of personnel at completion of mission.**

***WSS survey packet* should be *updated* as required, including AAR/debrief notes/report.**

". . .military professionalism is both a force multiplier* and *a force protection issue. . . ."

The ACEs of Prairie Warrior 96

"The Instructor Perspective"

by CPT James Lee, Military Intelligence Officer Advanced Course Instructor

The Vision

My chain of command approached me with the idea of taking a Military Intelligence Officer Advanced Course (MIOAC) through Prairie Warrior (PW). At the time, I was only required to teach 63 captains All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) skills to fill three Analytical Control Elements (ACEs).

PW 96 was an Advanced Warfighting Experiment (AWE) that tested Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C^3I) architectures using current doctrine and those of 2010. The exercise focused on two primary systems of the ATCCS (Army Tactical Command and Control System) architecture, those being the ASAS and Maneuver Control System - Phoenix (MCS-P). The experiment involved one advanced (96-02) and one basic (96-04) course at the Intelligence School, Fort Huachuca, AZ, and the 1995 Command General Staff College (CGSC) class at Fort Leavenworth, KS. The communications lines would span over 1,500 miles and be stressed by multiple automation systems.

This article provides insight into the PW 96 focusing on ACE and ASAS concepts as seen through the eyes of one instructor who had a part in developing and executing the experiment from its inception. It will not address issues relating to individual Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) but, instead, focus on collective training tasks required of the ACE and ASAS.

The Training Requirement

Our first challenge was how to train 63 MIOAC students operator-level ASAS skills in both All-Source and Single-Source disciplines and Army common core. The disciplines covered in excess of seven ASAS functional identities and over 10 common-core concepts. For those who do not understand ASAS terminology, I will explain specific terms in the ASAS lexicon. (A functional identity is a specific area within ASAS that provides software functions for a specific ACE requirement.) The challenge was to fill three functional ACEs with operators, analysts, and leaders out of the basic and advanced courses in six weeks. The reason this may be important to the casual reader is that those units that find themselves in a high turnover in their ACE personnel may want to use some facsimile of this training approach. This training strategy used a triage approach to teaching ASAS skills in a short period of time to field three fully operational ACEs. We required a triage approach due to the heavy student load, training difficulty, and minimum instructor staff available.

The short-term objective was to teach captains three basic areas required for ACE functions. The areas include: ASAS operator skills, Army common core, and single-discipline analytical skills. ASAS operator skills are necessary for the obvious reason of moving information through the ASAS of enclaves and into the ATCCS network to a client. Army common-core knowledge in both operations and intelligence disciplines from battalion to Echelons above Corps (EAC) are critical to fighting the ASAS. Finally, 98J (ELINT) and 98C (COMINT) basic analytical skills were necessary to conduct Single-Source analysis. The long-term objective was to build three cohesive ACE teams to support the exercise. The strategy allowed the instructors to accomplish two objectives simultaneously. First, satisfy the TRADOC requirement of sending competent officers to the field that can function at those levels. Second, to support the Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) down to brigade-level PW players at Fort Leavenworth. To accomplish this tremendous task, we would require sharp minds and outstanding instructor support from the Intelligence Center and School community.

Individual Training

The first three weeks of training focused on the short-term objective. Our plan combined the two disciplines training 10 hours a day using a split-shift methodology. In the morning, half of the class trained on ASAS skills in both All-Source and Single-Source skills while the other half of the class learned TDMP and IPB. In the afternoon, we taught the same classes after the groups switched. We broke the class into six teams that we categorized by ASAS functionality (e.g., Single-Source ELINT and COMINT, All-source system supervisor, data base manager, situation development, targeting). We broke them down by these disciplines understanding that ASAS training drove the train due to the limited ASAS resources available, i.e., machines/workstations, instructors, and time. We trained common-core instruction in conjunction with ASAS to enhance the students' abilities in analysis. This methodology proved to be successful in that the students learned both ASAS operator skills and Army common-core skills to facilitate fighting the system. This phase laid the foundation to continue the training into ACE operations.



Lesson Learned: **This synchronous training is highly intensive and requires the soldier to use at least two different parts of the brain. First, ASAS training requires the soldier to think binary in nature, i.e., what function leads to the next and so on. Second, you must teach soldier's concepts and how to apply them to an automated system. Following this phase, instructors need to ebb the training cycle to a reasonable pace to prevent burnout.**

ACE Operations

The ACE operations phase focused on breaking up the individual ASAS "functionality teams" and regrouping them into coherent ACE teams. We understood this to be the most difficult phase because learning ASAS buttonology is achievable, but the combination of individual disciplines and team synergy is much more difficult to realize. During this phase, two major stumbling blocks continued to plague our efforts to train ACEs. The lack of a coherent training scenario being fed from Corps Battlefield Simulation (CBS) through Tactical Simulation (TACSIM) and the limitation of one Compartmented ASAS Message Processing System (CAMPS) trying to handle traffic for three ACEs. (CBS is the simulation that allows both friendly and enemy forces to fight a battle at the Corps and below level.) (TACSIM is the simulation model that virtually reads the CBS battlefield and translates reports into MI technical messages which ASAS can understand.) (CAMPS is the communications interface system that allows the ASAS to transmit and receive messages in the USMTF format within the ATCCS architecture.)

Lesson Learned: **Without a coherent blue and red scenario, it is difficult to focus the ACE on common objectives such as answering PIR, HPT, and DPs. To overcome this barrier, we established limited objectives for given periods of time. This allowed the simulations contractors to achieve their objectives while simultaneously training the ACE.**

Because of the aforementioned problems, instructors were required to look at the simulation model's ground truth terminal, identify PIR or HPT that would occur and subsequently, make the ACEs find them. This allowed the instructors to structure training objectives for a given period of time. We used this methodology for two weeks of training to develop battle drills in establishing correct queries, alarms and External Data base Coordinations (EDCs) within the ACE. (The EDC is a message that carries a current representation of the All-Source data base for a specific echelon and/or unit that is designed to update the consumer data base.) Admittedly, this methodology seems disjointed, but it allowed the ACEs to drill critical functions within the ACE focusing on one- to two-hour periods. Within this framework, the ACEs were able to train in developing and executing queries and alarms in both the All-Source Enclave (ASE) and the Single-Source Enclave (SSE). Additionally, they trained in providing information to the commander through Target Information Data Messages (TIDATs), Threat Alerts (THALTs), and EDCs. (The TIDAT is a targeting message that answers a commander's HPT that feeds the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) through automated means.) (The THALT is a threat alert that sends a message of significant *enemy* activity on the battlefield designed to feed into the ATCCS network of automated systems.) The benefits we observed were a form of ACE synergism focusing all the separate ACE functions on a common objective. Second, the realization that a single CAMPS trying to handle three ACEs would not work. The problem persisted until we added a Communications Control Set (CCS) to each ACE. (The CCS is the communications interface system developed before CAMPS.) Although CAMPS has additional ports, the system cannot handle the traffic load even with the New Technology (NT) patch. This remains an unresolved problem. This phase of ACE operations requires cadre that clearly understands the intelligence cycle, collection management, targeting, and ASAS functionality/interoperability. You must work all these disciplines simultaneously within the ACE with key leaders to provide timely and relevant intelligence to the commander.



Figure 1: ACE Responsibility Integration

Lesson Learned: **The cadres need to understand that there are two spheres of influence that are operating which will defeat one another if allowed. The spheres that I am referring to are vertical and horizontal. The *vertical* sphere involves the individual operators and their workstation responsibilities. The *horizontal* sphere involves the leaders/roamers that must keep the ACE working toward a common objective, the commander's PIR. (See Figure 1.)**

The operators become focused on the machine and, over time, discard what is happening outside their *perceived* area of responsibility. The Battle Captain, the Field Artillery Intelligence Officer (FAIO), and the Collection Manager must work the horizontal piece to synchronize the ACEs' efforts with the commander's overall needs. (See Figure 1.) We did not achieve this training objective during ACE operations because we did not fully understand the mechanics involved until better qualified instructors arrived late in the training process. We did not attain this level until the Mini-Ex a week subsequent to Prairie Warrior and only then did the ACEs begin to realize the synchrony of the ACE with the commander's needs.



Lesson Learned: **The addition of dedicated CCSs and a coherent scenario allowed the students to rise to a new level of skills and confidence in the system. When operators are truly working toward a common objective and the system works without having to conduct fault isolation drills, their confidence level increases.**

The Warlord Family Issue

An additional problem we contended with was how to take an off-the-shelf system known as Reconfigurable Work Station Lap-Top (RWS LT) and integrate it into the communications and TTP architecture. By the second SIMEX, we had figured out most of the connectivity issues, but the missing piece was the TTPs associated with fighting the multitude of assets. Each client headquarters, 18 in all, had RWS LTs and consequently, wanted to use them for different functions. (See Figure 2.) The RWS proved to be a valuable tool for sharing intelligence but clearly had some limitations. The RWS LT has a memory limitation in the hard drive because, as the system reaches capacity, its processing capability reduces.



Figure 2: RWS Communications Architecture

Lesson Learned: **Our workaround was to send initial EDCs vice updates and then send databases instead of EDCs to allow the consumer to overwrite their old files. This allowed the RWS LT to save memory space hence, decreasing processing time. Additionally, we had the ACE parse all EDCs prior to sending them, which saved the client RWS LTs parsing/processing time at their end. (The ASAS parses messages by recognizing specific message fields and assigning the message given specific routing commands.) Essentially we now were sending data bases ready to be queried by our clients in the field.**

Through software upgrades and discovery, the students were able to find workarounds that saved client warfighters time at their end. The RWS provided warfighters the additional value of sharing intelligence with MCS-P by sharing graphic depictions of the common enemy picture being developed by the ACE and the Analytical and Control Team (ACT) and, conversely, by sharing the relevant common picture with the ACE from the MCS-P. The RWS LT allowed this type of information sharing to and from intelligence providers and warfighters. ACTs must learn the RWS for their future survival. The RWS LT provides a cost effective, interactive intelligence platform and is deployable from Corps to battalion level. The system's greatest utility is its ability to produce valuable, timely intelligence to the warfighter.

Prairie Warrior

Prairie Warrior enlightened the entire chain of command on a myriad of TTP issues related to fighting new technology. We began PW with individual skills and limited ACE operations capability. As we began working closer with the CGSC students at Fort Leavenworth, the mission became much clearer. We now had a coherent scenario to work with and a G2 that articulated his needs. The first week of PW 96 was a struggle in coordination and TTP development focused on the level of detail required from the EDCs, IntReps, IntSums and Relevant Common Picture (RCP). (The RCP is the combined friendly and enemy pictures overlaid on each other in MCS-P.)

The TTP include two categories: the limitations of the new technology and what TTP will allow the operators to work around the problems, and what products can we expect to produce on the new technology and their utility (i.e., graphics, EDCs, TIDATs, written products, and communications).

The first issue is that ASAS and RWS can only produce products for specific echelons in a given amount of time. We found that, on the average, the ACE could produce an update EDC for a division-level picture within 10 minutes and transmit it to the client. We did find that if you wanted a more focused EDC with echelon-specific data that required changing EDC parameters, an average of 30 minutes was required to get the information to the consumer. This EDC provided only those units the client wanted and reduced the amount of unidentified units. We must remember - the EDC is a product of pre-analysis from the ACE. It provides the current information/data base in a manner that updates the consumer's data base to support their individual analysis needs.



Lesson Learned: **The point is that the client unit must clearly articulate their needs in terms of scope (echelon, unit, equipment, installation) that will then be translated into time of release. Commanders need to understand the limitations of their systems as articulated by the operators because training level is a big factor in developing products.**

Graphic IntReps are separate products that are time-consuming because of the functionality of the RWS and the level of detail required of the analytical product. We found that for a division-level graphic, it required at least one hour to produce a comprehensive product that included maneuver, artillery, and ADA. This product included the picture down to regimental level and battery level for ADA, along with a written assessment of the picture.

Lesson Learned: **We found the best way to construct this type of graphic product is to build a BOS-specific overlay every 30 minutes and then, at the agreed-upon time, provide the combined/comprehensive picture by merging the separate products.**

Developing TTP for production and consequently dissemination is critical to the success of the ACE and client units. When developing the TTP, units should consider two factors: first, what critical battlefield events are going to occur or are occurring, second what dissemination timelines do you want to set to satisfy ongoing information requirements. The key is synchronizing the dissemination plan with the critical events in the battle while continuing to meet standard information timelines. This can be a difficult task due to the limited number of ASAS workstations, Warlords, and communications connections. (See figure 3)



Figure 3: ACE Synchronization

Lesson Learned: **The ACE chief must decide what priorities to assign to the different products leaving the All-Source Enclave (ASE) such as TIDATs, EDCs, and THALTs. Disseminate additional products, such as graphic IntReps and IntSums, on a timeline unless the G2 has a specific requirement. The system will recognize the difference between routine and priority. By doing this, the ACE chief assures the critical intelligence is leaving the ACE with the proper priority. We discovered the most timely way to send critical information is to call it in using MSE and following it up with an automated product. Given, the ACE cannot call all clients in the ATCCs architecture hence, requiring a prioritized dissemination schedule for automated products.**

The PW architecture had all the staff functions being conducted at Fort Leavenworth while the ACEs conducted the preponderance of analysis at Fort Huachuca. This created an additional burden of articulating task, purpose and intent over phones and automated systems. This burden was primarily felt by the G2 at Fort Leavenworth and the supporting ACE. The G2 was either very specific or general in his guidance. Initially, the guidance was very specific, articulated as PIR, SIR, or HPT, but, as the battle progressed, the guidance became more general in scope. PIR and SIR were no longer developed but, instead, the G2 developed what he called his Key Focus. These were more general statements that the ACE had to translate into SIR to support querying the ASAS.



Figure 4: ACE Support

Lesson Learned: **The G2 and the ACE must collocate to facilitate a more clear and succinct communication flow. Because the G2 could not periodically meet with the ACE chief and collection manager, he experienced increased difficulty in synchronization. Maintaining pace with the battle cannot be achieved unless you have a cohesive intelligence team that includes the G2 staff and the ACE. (See Figure 4.)**

Collection Management

Prairie Warrior required a heavy emphasis on Collection Management (CM) and its subfunctions. It must be stated from the outset that currently ASAS has a limited CM functionality. ASAS also can perform only the Asset Management functionality. Requirements and Mission Management (RM, MM) are not functions presently available on ASAS, but the Battle Command Battle Lab, Fort Huachuca, is developing a collection management tool to serve this purpose. To support the G2, the students developed CM worksheets on their laptop computers using either a Microsoft table or EXCEL spreadsheet. The CM worksheet satisfied the RM and MM requirements for the missions. We used PIR to establish alarms and SIR to build specific queries in both enclaves. Initially, this product had great utility but, as the campaign progressed, it became a laborious task to update the worksheet. To facilitate CM needs later in the campaign, the students developed a new CM format that was easier to update and disseminate. (See Figure 5.) This product included all the pertinent CM data required to fight ASAS and to support the G2.



Figure 5: Collection Management Tool

Lesson Learned: **The CM worksheet is a useful tool when planning the initial phase of the campaign but requires too much effort to update and disseminate. ACEs need to develop a separate product focused on their unit's CM requirements which transition for subsequent phases of the campaign. The product must include all the information required to develop the Collection Emphasis Requirements Report (CERR). (The CERR translates the collection plan into specific taskings and requests in a written paragraph format that is disseminated to the asset managers.)**

Targeting

Targeting was another area upon which Prairie Warrior placed great demands. Initially, we attempted to conduct targeting using the ASE and SSE targeting work stations but discovered, given the asset-reporting limitations, we could not provide targets that met the commander's nomination criteria. The students learned that they had to use multiple systems to pass valid targets. They used a combination of JSTARs, UAV, ASE-Targeting, and SSE-Targeting to accomplish the targeting mission. First, they identified targeted enemy units through the ASE situation work station to determine if they were in range. Then they verified it on the JSTAR's terminal (CGS) to get the most current location and target parameters (in column, on line, in a box). Finally, if UAV was available, they requested a mission from GS assets to overfly the target to achieve a higher level of targeting fidelity. When this was accomplished, the target was sent by voice and via automated means (TIDAT). This process took 10 minutes or up to an hour depending on the asset availability at any given time. Because we had not completely learned how to send a TIDAT from the ASE in the most timely manner, we were forced to make the phone call then back it up by sending the TIDAT.

Lesson Learned: **Targeting is a multi-function process requiring input from all systems in the ACE. The process requires the FAIO to relentlessly work all the work stations in the ACE (horizontal). You must inform all participants in the targeting effort of the endstate to conduct effective targeting. The TIDAT function works, but soldiers must know how to fill in the TIDAT mask and send it quickly through the ATCCS architecture.**

Conclusion

ASAS is and will remain the primary Intelligence fusion system for Force XXI and requires all soldiers in the future MI Corps to learn its capabilities. Prairie Warrior did convince this instructor that ASAS is a sound system for intelligence fusion and dissemination. The system performs the fusion function much faster than the old human fusion capability. A word of caution, however; the system ***does not conduct analysis***, this function is left to the operators and leaders. Commanders at all levels must know that ASAS gives you the answer to the question/query you ask of it. If you ask an incorrect question, an incorrect answer will be provided. The positive attribute, given this limitation, is that ASAS is flexible enough to react when the correction is made. We can measure this flexibility in terms of seconds and minutes vice hours. ASAS Block I Extended has limitations, but its attributes, to date, outweigh the limitations a hundred fold. The students during the exercise were able to submit in excess of 50 software upgrade additions that should complement existing capabilities once implemented. ASAS is not perfect, but it is damn good at what it is required to do, and, as future leaders of the Force XXI MI Corps, it is incumbent upon us to master this system.✪

✚ FIELD SANITATION TEAM TRAINING ✚

By: LTC Michael Thomas, MS, 139th Med Group

AR 40-5, ***Preventive Medicine,*** requires companies and units of equivalent size that deploy to the field to appoint FSTs. This article provides a description of the equipment and supplies that should be maintained by an FST. The FST should maintain a recommended stocking of preventive medicine (PM) materials. A listing of the basic load that each FST should have is shown below. This listing includes three-foot lockers for storing the supplies. These PM materials are to be used in support of training exercises, not just in support of real-world missions. The old adage that states that a unit fights the same way it trains is also true for PM. If your unit takes field sanitation seriously during training exercises, it will be much more likely to know how to survive if necessary in a real-world situation. Frequently, real-field sanitation needs arise on training missions. The 139th Medical Group's PM Section is available to answer any questions you might have about FSTs. Just send your questions in written form to the 139th Preventive Medical Group, 11101 Independence Avenue, Independence, MO 64054. You may also make telephone inquiries by calling (816) 836-7000 and providing a number where you may be reached. The PM Section will return your call as quickly as possible.





BASIC LOAD FOR A FIELD SANITATION TEAM*

ITEM/DESCRIPTION	*UNIT*	*QUANTITY/NSN IND*
1. Tablets, water purification iodine	BN 1	6850-00-985-7166
2. Foot powder, fungicide 1 oz (28.4 g)	CN 1	6505-01-008-3054
3. Swatter, fly	PG 4/100	3740-00-252-3383
4. Trap, mouse, spring, wood	DZ 3/100	3740-00-252-3384
5. Trap, rat, spring, woodbase w/4-way rls	DZ 3/100	3740-00-260-1398
6. Insecticide, aerosol can (12oz)	CN 1	6840-01-067-6674
7. Insect and leech repellent	BT 1	6840-00-753-4963
8. Rodenticide anticoagulant bait (5 lb)	CN 1/100	6840-00-753-4973
9. Chlorination kit, water purification	KT 1/22	6850-00-270-6225
10. Duster, manually operated tubular**	EA 1/unit	3740-00-132-5936
11. Calcium Hypochlorite (3 3/4 lb) ***	BX 1/unit	6810-00-242-4770
12. Sprayer, insecticide, hand, 2gal cap	EA 1/unit	3740-00-641-4719
13. Disinifectant, food service	BG 25/unit	6840-01-035-5432
14. Trunk, Locker ****	EA 3/unit	8460-00-243-3234
15. Thermometer, degree F	EA 2/unit	6685-00-444-6500
16. Apron, impermeable duck, rubber ctd	EA 2/unit	8415-00-082-6108
17. Respirator, pesticide	EA 2/unit	4240-01-035-9250
18. Goggles, safety, plastic, adjstbl, hdbnd	PR 2/unit	4240-00-052-3776

*** Authorized as per CTA 8-100.**

**** Bulk Lindane powder used with the manual duster will be issued as needed upon deployment.**

***** Item is distributed in cases of 12 (3 3/4-lb) cans. One case will supply a battalion-sized unit with an adequate supply of calcium hypochlorite. This item can also be used to clean protective masks and to sanitize water trailers.**

******Authorized as per CTA 50-909.**



PM LESSON - U.S. TROOPS IN BOTSWANA, 1992

BY CPT STAN CALOW, MS, 139TH MEDICAL GROUP

In January 1992, 169 U.S. Army soldiers participated in a joint training exercise with host-country defense forces in Botswana, Africa. The 10-day exercise consisted of simulated fighting, and weapons training. Temperatures during the exercise reached 120 degrees. Many soldiers chose to sleep on mats directly on the ground. On return to home station, approximately 30 percent of the troops required medical treatment, with complaints of fever, headaches, joint pain, nausea and other symptoms. The illness was identified as Spotted Fever Rickettsiosis, most likely transmitted by insect and tick bites.

The investigation found that less than half the deployed troop reported using DEET-containing insect repellent for the skin, and less than 10 percent used permethrin-based clothing protectant. Soldiers who did not use cots or hammocks were more likely to contact the illness.

LESSONS LEARNED:

In today's Army, Active and Reserve units are participating in support missions all over the world. Conditions in some places can present a real threat to unprepared troops. Units deploying for support missions must plan for the potential medical problems they might encounter.

In this case, basic PM measures, including use of insect repellents and discipline in sleeping arrangements, could have prevented the problem.

Units that are deploying overseas should not take for granted that all PM planning issues have been taken care of for them. Supplies which can help, including hammocks, are available to any unit through normal supply channels. It is essential to brief all deploying soldiers on PM issues early in the preparation for deployment.

Even healthy, fit troops can be made ineffective if their leaders do not take preventive medicine seriously.



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